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Thank you for the invitation. It is a great honour to deliver this lecture, the 
second in memory of the late Dame Ann Ebsworth.1
 
 I would also like to thank 
the audience for attending. Like accepting a judicial appointment, one tends to 
attend lectures like this out of a misplaced sense of duty. 
There was some uncertainty about the date of the first lecture during the 
beginning of 2006 because the invited speaker, Michael Kirby, had been 
nominated as the Australian of the Year. To prevent a recurrence the 
organisers invited me. They knew that there was no chance of something 
similar happening to me.  
 
My claims to fame are modest. One of them, let me state immediately, is not 
constitutional law. But I share something with Lord Denning: like him I ran a 
one-man commission of inquiry with political under- and overtones. His 
concerned Profumo; mine government-sponsored hit squads. Like him, I did not 
survive unscathed. My reputation in the words of Oscar Kokoschka died three 
times.  
 
Because of the publicity surrounding the commission I was, with Mr Mandela, a 
runner-up as newsmaker of the year in 1990. Mr FW de Klerk won. At the time I 
was quite pleased with the award. Since then both of them went on to win the 
Nobel Prize; and I, not even a booby prize. Some years later, one Max was 
                                            
* Judge of the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa.  Professor Extraordinarius of 
Mercantile Law, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein. 
1  This lecture honours Dame Ann Ebsworth who died in 2002 of cancer. She was but sixty-
four years of age and was the first woman to be appointed directly to the Queen's Bench 
Division of the High Court. 
 
LTC HARMS J  PER/PELJ 2009(12)3 
3/161 
nominated as the newsmaker of the year. Max, since deceased, was a gorilla at 
the Johannesburg Zoo. That hurt. 
 
Under these circumstances I was somewhat apprehensive about accepting the 
invitation. It is a daunting task for someone with my background to address this 
audience; more so because I have to follow on the act of Michael Kirby. It is 
obviously absurd to attempt to imitate or eclipse a masterpiece (Vila-Matas). 
Since, as Barry Unsworth would have it, the truth lay in contradiction, I thought 
that I was expected to counterbalance Kirby.  
 
He spoke about women at the bar and on the bench. One matter he failed to 
deal with was the origin of the discrimination against them. Let me deal with the 
omission. It all began with Calpurnia. She was a Roman lawyer. Dissatisfied 
with a ruling, the classics tell us, she turned her back on the Bench and lifted 
her toga – that was before the days of Victoria's Secrets. This led to the ban, 
which lasted for two millennia. Fortunately, there have been no reports of 
similar incidents since the removal of the ban. 
 
Uplifting the ban did not lead to equality. For instance, it seems that the law 
reporters cannot come to grips with the fact that a woman could be a judge. 
The BAILII reports of the judgment in Mark Jones v Welsh Rugby Union refer to 
Dame Ann, as late as 1997, as Mr Justice! 
 
Judging in general 
Having reached the age and stage where I can and should retire I have 
obviously formed some views about judging.  
 
The great bullfighter, Belmonte, was once asked to explain his method of 
fighting.2
                                            
2  Vila-Matas Bartleby & Co 157. 
 He answered: "Well, I don't know! Honestly I don't. I don't know the 
LTC HARMS J  PER/PELJ 2009(12)3 
4/161 
rules, nor do I believe in them. I feel bullfighting and, without worrying about the 
rules, I go about it in my own way." 
 
The same applies to judging. It is, by and large, an unconscious act. And it is 
not only about law; it is primarily about facts. Once you have the facts, the law 
tends to take care of itself. That is unless you fall for what Sir Robert Megarry 
called the temptation of the Law by putting forth unappealable decisions of law 
or, in appeal judgments, by pontificating about irrelevant legal issues.3
 
  
Judges do not choose the facts unless they are dishonest. Occasionally a judge 
has a choice about the applicable law. Then, one would expect, the judge 
would act as any reasonable person would – apply the rule or interpretation that 
provides the fairest result.  
 
What I intend to explore tonight is whether judging under a Bill of Rights is all 
that different from judging without one. If, at the end of it all, you conclude that I 
am an agnostic, deserving to be burnt at the stake, I shall not be surprised. 
 
Introduction of a Bill of Rights 
Until 27 April 1994 we in South Africa had a 'supreme' parliament; and the 
function of courts was to enforce – and not to question – laws. On that date an 
interim Constitution came into effect which on 4 February 1997 was replaced by 
a final Constitution – how final is another issue. With this came a Bill of Rights. 
The Constitution is the 'supreme law' and, in its own terms, is the "cornerstone 
of democracy in South Africa". Importantly, law and conduct inconsistent with it 
is invalid, and the obligations imposed thereby must be fulfilled. It enshrines the 
rights of all people in the country and affirms the democratic values of human 
dignity, equality and freedom. 
 
                                            
3  Megarry 1980 Austr LJ 61. 
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The Bill of Rights can, with justification, be described as one of the most 'liberal' 
in the world. Given our history and given money, precedents and input from, 
amongst others, Canada, Germany and Scandinavia, it could hardly have been 
otherwise.  
 
No one can doubt the value of a liberal Bill of Rights. The ability to scrutinise 
and declare laws of parliament invalid is awesome. The capacity to develop the 
common law is priceless. To be able to backchat when the lawgiver speaks – 
even coherently – is something to treasure. I would never wish to live under 
another system again.  
 
But sometimes too much of a good thing can cause indigestion. This the Danes 
now know (I am not referring to their pork but to cartoons and the freedom of 
expression). A constitution can be too liberal or too democratic. For example, 
ours recognises eleven official languages and purports to give them equal 
status and protection. In addition, it requires the promotion of at least 15 others. 
This simply does not work. 
 
Unfortunately, the word 'liberal' is undergoing a change of meaning. It is now 
used, usually with a racial undertone, as a synonym for 'rightwing'.4
 
  
One reason for the distrust of liberal values may be because African societal 
norms differ significantly from those of northern Europe – they are not 
inherently 'liberal' in the classical sense. The individual is less important than 
the community. For instance, communal property is the rule; not private 
ownership. In spite of what some Americans believe, a Bill of Rights designed 
for one community in a particular historical setting cannot, without 
complications, be adopted by another.5
 
  
                                            
4  According to the Financial Times of 20 July 2006, the head of the national broadcaster 
said that "…the right, which in South Africa, is euphemistically and incorrectly referred to 
as liberal …". 
5  There are admittedly a number of third generation rights – some with compliments from 
India – entrenched in the Bill of Rights but, as I shall show, they have produced their own 
problems. 
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The Constitution requires of the judiciary to advance the values of an open and 
democratic society. Democracy is itself the highest political end (Lord Acton) 
unless one shares Malcolm Muggeridge's view that an autocracy tempered by 
the occasional assassination is somewhat better. Democracy is supposed to 
mean a government by the majority that respects the rights and interests of the 
minority. But the term is loaded; it means whatever one wants it to mean. As 
George Orwell once said:6
 
  
In the case of a word like democracy, not only is there no agreed definition, but an 
attempt to make one is resisted from all sides. It is almost universally felt that when 
we call a country democratic we are praising it: consequently the defenders of 
every kind of regime claim that it is a democracy, and fear that they might have to 
stop using that word if it were tied to any one meaning. Words of this kind are 
often used in a consciously dishonest way. That is, the person who uses them has 
his own private definition, but allows his hearer to think that he means something 
quite different. 
 
Maybe I should not have been surprised when reading in a judgment that pre-
litigation discovery is a "fitting philosophical approach to dispute resolution in an 
open and democratic society". Otherwise I am not sure what the effect of 
'democracy' is on the interpretation of the Bill of Rights although I am reminded 
of the Rumanian law professor who was asked some years ago by a student to 
explain why the right to freedom of expression guaranteed by its Soviet-based 
Constitution was not the same as the right of freedom of speech one finds in, 
say, the USA. Replied the professor: We may have freedom of speech; but that 
does not mean that we have freedom after speech. The point is that a 
democratic constitution does not create a democracy. During November 2006, 
The Economist ranked South Africa as a 'defective democracy', even less 
democratic than Britain. 
 
Bills of rights are by their very nature drafted in general terms and cannot be 
too specific to have any permanent value. They have to cater for future 
generations. A bill of rights is, contrary to what Justice Scalia believes, a living 
organism. Ours, it has been said, is not only a formal document regulating 
public power but it also embodies an objective, normative value system. 
However, as a legal document it says some things and doesn't say others. And 
                                            
6  Orwell Politics and the English Language. 
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it sometimes employs high-sounding words containing incompatible concepts.7
 
 
This enables judges to fudge and jargon to replace principle. It also can lead to 
the politicisation of issues and judgments: 
Constitutional cases [says Richard A Posner] in the open area are aptly regarded 
as 'political' because the Constitution is about politics and because cases in the 
open area are not susceptible of confident evaluation on the basis of professional 
legal norms. They can be decided only on the basis of a political judgment, and a 
political judgment cannot be called right or wrong by reference to legal norms…8
 
 
There is another downside. Politicians who are unwilling to make difficult or 
unpopular decisions are able to hide behind a bill of rights, not only when 
drafting it but also thereafter. For example, it is a matter of common knowledge 
that violent crime is endemic in South Africa – 18 000 murders during 2005 – 
and that we had the death penalty. In view of the popular support in the country 
for the retention of the death penalty, those who negotiated the bill of rights 
chose to avoid the issue. Instead, they left it to the courts to decide in the light 
of the relatively vague basic rights. They intentionally created what they called 
'constructive ambiguities'. Now politicians can and do hide behind the judgment 
of the Constitutional Court, which declared it unconstitutional, if the matter is 
raised. And the courts and the Bill of Rights get the blame for the crime rate. 
 
The equality provision in the Bill of Rights is, in the light of the country's history, 
at the forefront. Discrimination based on marital status or sexual orientation, 
amongst other factors, is specifically proscribed. In spite of this, government 
could not make up its mind how to deal with same-sex relationships. It had a 
few options but, because of its concern about the public acceptability of 
legislation, it simply sat back and waited for the Constitutional Court to tell it 
how to deal with the matter. When the deadline set by the Constitutional Court 
arrived a bill, said to comply with the Constitutional Court's prescripts, was 
rammed through Parliament without proper debate. Once again, responsibility 
for a political decision was shifted from the political arm of government where it 
belongs to the judicial, where it does not belong. Blame the courts, again. 
 
                                            
7  Justice Young's phrase: (2006) 80 ALJ 148. 
8  Posner 2005 Harv LR 40. 
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Let me be clear about this: I do not favour the return to the death penalty and I 
do not object to the formalisation of same-sex relationships. I mention these 
examples to raise, without answering, the question of whether a bill of rights 
should reflect existing societal values or whether it should create them. The 
upside is that bills of rights remove the debate about basic rights from the 
democratic process because democracy, in the sense of majority rule, is 
inimical to the protection of classical liberal human rights.9
 
  
This tension between liberalism and democracy is acutely felt in judging. Add to 
that third generation rights such as rights to housing and the like. The 
Germans, as could be expected, made many thorough theoretical analyses of 
the issue. One writer came to the conclusion that judicial review is a practice 
suspended between notions of populism, progressivism, constitutionalism and 
democracy.10
 
 Democracy at least is not an –ism. 
The power to strike down legislation has its own limitations. It may lead to 
chaos. For this reason the Constitutional Court uses a rule of prospective 
unconstitutionality: it declares laws unconstitutional from a future date. This 
gives rise to incongruous results because the successful litigant is in fact 
unsuccessful.  
 
Another method to solve the problem caused by invalid legislation is to use 
interpretational devices to make the legislation compatible with the Constitution. 
These devices are called 'reading down', 'reading-in' and 'severance'. The 
effect of this is that explicit words of statutes are ignored. 
 
As the Bard said about roses, a spade remains a spade even if called a shovel 
or a pitchfork. It goes further: The distinction between interpretation and 
legislation is fast disappearing and the separation of power, which is so 
fundamental to the Constitution and any bill of rights, is being eroded.  
  
                                            
9  Hayek The Road to Serfdom argues this point well. 
10  Ulrich Haltren, discussed by Venter 2005 ZaöRV 129. 
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Judicial activism and judicial realism  
A bill of rights does not provide any justification for courts to disregard any legal 
rule, statutory or common-law. On the contrary, it is the reason why courts must 
act within the confines of legal rules. Many judges do not understand this. One 
finds a bit too often that judges use the Bill of Rights as an excuse for ignoring 
the law. The difference between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the 
dictatorship of the wig and gown is one of degree and not one of substance. 
 
When speaking about 'judicial activism' a good starting point is the warning of 
Lord Bingham that "[c]onstitutional dangers exist no less in too little judicial 
activism as in too much".11
 
  
Somewhere [said Michael Kirby in Judicial Activism] between the spectre of a 
lawless judge, pursuing political ideas of his or her own from the judicial seat, 
irrespective of the law, and the idealised mechanic of the daydreams of the strict 
formalists, lies a place in which real judges perform their duties; neither wholly 
mechanical or excessive creative. 
 
In general, I agree because he here equates judicial activism with judicial 
realism and not surrealism.  
 
The lawless judge can pursue ideas other than political ones. And the lawless 
judge can also have a knee-jerk reaction to issues with which the judge is 
besotted. It is perplexing to know of judges whose answer to any particular 
problem, irrespective of the facts, irrespective of the law, and irrespective of the 
argument, is predictable.  
 
Two further points may be made in this regard. First, as Justice Heydon 
observed, many modern judges think that they can not only right every social 
wrong, but are also able to achieve some form of immortality in doing so.12
                                            
11  A v Home Secretary [2005] 2 AC 68 par [41].  
 
They disregard the 'principle of judicial modesty'. They are blissfully unaware of 
the fact that 75 percent of Americans know the names of two of Snow White's 
dwarfs but that only 25 per cent know the names of two Supreme Court giants. 
12  Barker 2005 ALJ 783. 
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They write for selected newspapers and not for the law reports. It really is easy 
to write popular judgments; the unpopular ones require intellectual honesty. 
 
The second point is that "the dignity of intelligence lies in recognising that it is 
limited; and that the universe exists outside it".13 Judicial flashing and 
intellectual arrogance are too often part of the judicial armoury. The tutor of 
Emperor Marcus Aurelius (Epictetus) argued that we must distinguish between 
what lies within our power and what lies outside; we must learn to master the 
former and accept the latter.14
 
 Put differently, one should be the spectator of 
oneself always, at least a little (paraphrasing Ronald Firbank). 
Courts old and new 
With the adoption of a constitution as the supreme law came a constitutional 
court. The result was two so-called apex courts, the Constitutional Court for 
constitutional issues and the other, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), for all 
other matters. Initially our court (then still called the Appellate Division or AD) 
could not decide constitutional matters at all. That gave rise to so many 
problems that its jurisdiction was extended to include constitutional matters. 
With that came an appeal from the one apex court to the other.  
 
The jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court is supposed to be limited to 
'constitutional issues' and 'issues related thereto'. In fact it is unlimited. Implicitly 
the argument is along these lines: the Constitution is the Grundnorm of all law 
(common or statutory); because the common law derives its authority from the 
Constitution all common law rules raise constitutional issues. Because statutes 
derive their force from the Constitution, so, too, are all statutory issues 
constitutional. And since these legal issues can arise only in a factual context, 
all factual decisions are 'related to' constitutional issues. 
 
                                            
13  The Baron of Teive (Fernando Pessoa's one heteronym). 
14  Grayling The Heart of Things 202. 
LTC HARMS J  PER/PELJ 2009(12)3 
11/161 
Judging or fudging 
The common law has always provided (more or less) that everyone has the 
right to administrative action that is lawful, somewhat reasonable, and 
procedurally fair. This right has now been constitutionalised and is entrenched. 
Obviously, if a statute provides differently, it is invalid. Otherwise everything 
remains pretty much the same. Except this, one has to get used to a new 
vocabulary. Buzzwords such as accountability, transparency and proportionality 
abound. One has to write with circumlocution. Subsidiary legislation is not 
merely ultra vires. (Sorry, I forgot that Latin is strictly verboten.) No, one has 
first to refer to the principle of legality; throw in some quotes; mention that the 
Constitution is built on it; explain the break with the past; throw in more quotes; 
move to purposive construction; remember that context is everything; look at 
the provision through the prism of the Constitution; add further quotes; then see 
whether the enabling statute is compatible with the Constitution; make another 
analysis of the subsidiary legislation; reach for a thesaurus for adjectives and 
adverbs with a compassionate undertone; reach for the noter-up to pad 
footnotes; and so it goes on.  
 
Verbosity is the name of the game. We have a problem with grandiosity; and 
we tend to embellish judgments with needless puffery (paraphrasing Posner). 
All this leads to 'staleness of imagery' and 'lack of precision' (again George 
Orwell). A prism, by the way, breaks up and bends light. 
 
Benjamin Wittes remarked with reference to the US Supreme Court that: 
 
The justices don't have to observe precedent, so they fudge doctrine. They don't 
have to describe facts accurately, so they take liberties. They don't have to restrain 
themselves, so they don't. And they don't have to write opinions rigorously enough 
to give precise guidance to the lower courts, which do not have the luxury of 




Our common law was, and still is, Roman Dutch law, a system closely related 
to Scots law and suffused by natural law concepts. Bear in mind that its 
                                            
15  Quoted by Posner (n 8) 63. 
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greatest exponent was Hugo Grotius. Our constitutional law, however, was 
English law.  
 
From these two great systems we inherited a large number of basic rights 
including equal justice, freedom, freedom of speech, dignity, and rights such as 
the right to privacy and the like. These rights were not entrenched, but the 
judiciary always saw it as its duty to protect them to the fullest extent possible. 
 
Roman Dutch law can adapt itself to deal with new challenges and changing 
conditions consistent with its inherent basic principles. This enabled higher 
courts on sound policy grounds to change the direction of the law because "the 
law must be sensitive to human development and social change" and "judges 
must necessarily look to the present and to the future as well as to the past". 
On the other hand, the public requires certainty from our law rather than 
doctrinal purity or juristic rightness because the law is not seamless (as an 
Australian judge said). 
 
In one of the leading cases in the Constitutional Court, Sir Sidney Kentridge, 
who sat on that court occasionally, made two important findings. First, one 
should, if possible, decide cases without reference to the Constitution, and 
second, the Constitution did not create rights retrospectively. Taking these 
points seriously, our court was soon faced with the problem of the press's 
liability for defamation in Bogoshi. It had during 1982, in Pakendorf, held the 
media strictly liable for factual inaccuracies. The series of defamatory articles in 
issue in Bogoshi were published in the main before the advent of the interim 
Constitution. We could not rely on its guarantee of freedom of expression. We 
had, consequently, to decide whether we could, as a matter of policy, overrule 
Pakendorf. We then took a conscious decision to overrule it, bringing our law 
more or less in line with later English developments in Reynolds v Times 
Newspapers Ltd [1999] UKHL 45 and Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl 
[2006] UKHL 44. But some who read with blinkers, although happy with the 
result, were upset because we did not rely on constitutional values. We did not 
understand, says one learned professor, 'transformative constitutionalism'. He 
did not understand the facts of the case. 
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The Pakendorf judgment is also quoted by some as proof of the fact that the SA 
common law was "fundamentally affected by the cancer of apartheid". The 
problem is that the case had no racial undertones and our court thought that it 
was adopting English law.  
 
By the way, a newspaper recently referred to the Anton Piller procedure as an 
apartheid era procedure.16
 
 So much for labels. 
In another instance, a judge sought to create a rule about police liability 
"shaped by memory of that which lay at the very heart of our apartheid past". 
The SCA subsequently reminded him that his 'new' rule had been the law since 
at least 1912.  
 
Not much different is a judgment by the SCA that decided that a 1972 judgment 
was right on the question of law – political office bearers can sue for defamation 
– but for good measure found that it had been wrong on the facts.  
 
When the SCA held that a particular exemption clause or a non-variation clause 
was valid, according to the same professor it –  
 
denied the fundamentally political, transformational nature of the constitution and 
the developments that are required by its adoption as the heart of the post-
apartheid legal system.  
 
Another academic was more lyrical. The judgment he said: 
 
could have been mapped out in an Argentinean dance hall, so much it resembles 
a tango. The nimble little blind dancer, Justice, manages a tentative step forward 
once in a while only to be brutally reversed the length of the floor by her big, 
brutish partner, Business. Gliding along the floor she is subjected to a repetitive 
monologue, condemning her hopes and dreams as naïve and out of touch with 
reality. 
 
By the way, the successful party was a widow who depended on the rental 
income and not big, brutish business. Once again, disagree if you wish with the 
                                            
16  The Citizen 14 September 2006. 
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result, but why introduce politics into the debate. A bill of rights is supposed to 
be apolitical. But then, I am probably judicially challenged and judiciously 
impaired. 
 
Enforcing the Constitution 
Sir Hugh Laddie once remarked that "the courts are not a branch of social 
services whose job is to help the infirm or the unwise".17
 
 Under a bill of rights 
which emphasises social rights, this is not correct. Reading judgments, legal 
textbooks or law reviews nowadays can be confusing because it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to distinguish between law and the more esoteric social 
sciences.  
The problem is how to enforce social rights without impinging on the doctrine of 
separation of powers in a country where the lack of capacity (human and 
financial) is a serious problem and where there is not enough to go round. So 
far the courts have been singularly ineffective in making a difference. 
 
A group of rail commuters was able to claim a pyrrhic victory in the Metrorail 
case.18
                                            
17  Laddie R in Merck & Co Inc v Generics (UK) Ltd [2003] EWHC 2842 (Pat). 
 Travelling by train, in South Africa, is a dangerous venture attempted 
only by the audacious or the poor. Fed up, a group of commuters sought wide-
ranging relief, including a declaratory order that the train operator had a 
statutory duty to provide proper security for passengers and that it had failed to 
do so in violation of a number of constitutional rights. They asked for a 
mandamus requiring the railways to implement certain safety measures. The 
main factual dispute was whether or not the steps in place were reasonable 
and what other steps could or should be taken. The ultimate order was once 
again a declaratory order, this time declaring that Metrorail had an obligation to 
ensure that reasonable measures are taken to provide for the security of rail 
commuters. Back to square one, I would have thought, and little comfort for the 
18  Rail Commuters Action Group v Transnet t/a Metrorail 2005 (2) SA 359 (CC). 
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fourteen commuters who, during May 2006, were flung to their death from a 
train during a strike of security guards. Members of the pragmatic school of 
jurisprudence would be horrified, I suppose.  
 
Developing the common law 
There rests a duty on courts to develop the common law in accordance with 
constitutional demands. What this entails, though, is not quite clear. Sometimes 
it may seem that if the result is unpalatable this jurisdiction is relied on without 
defining the new rule. And it may appear that the identity of the plaintiff or that 
of the defendant may play a role in this regard. To illustrate the point I intend to 
limit myself to a comparison between two cases in the field of vicarious liability. 
Yes, vicarious liability may be a constitutional issue. Well, at least sometimes.  
 
In Phoebus Apollo Aviation CC v Minister of Safety and Security19
 
 the facts 
were, briefly, that Phoebus had been robbed of a very large amount of cash. 
The robbers buried the cash on land belonging to the father of one of the 
robbers. Three policemen who were not involved in the investigation of the 
robbery went to the premises on false pretences, in a police vehicle, and 
induced the father to hand over the cash. The money was never traced. The 
SCA held that the state was not vicariously liable for the wrongdoing of the 
policemen. And the Constitutional Court dismissed an appeal because the case 
did not raise a constitutional issue and because there was no reason, it said, 
why the common law should be developed so as to impose liability on the State 
for the conduct of its employees committed dishonestly and in pursuit of their 
own selfish interest. The court accepted counsel's concession that the 
common-law test for vicarious liability, as it stands, is consistent with the 
Constitution. And the court accepted that the application of this test to the facts 
of a particular case is not a question of law but one of fact pure and simple. 
                                            
19  2002 (5) SA 475 (SCA); 2003 (2) SA 34 (CC). 
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The outcome in K v Minister of Safety and Security20
 
 was different. K, a young 
woman, went out for an evening with her boyfriend. They left a pub at about 
midnight but then had an argument and the boyfriend refused to take her home. 
A police car drew up; three police officers in uniform were in the car. The driver 
asked her where she wanted to go and offered to take her home. She got into 
the vehicle. They took her to a remote spot where all three raped her. They 
were all convicted and are serving life sentences. K sued the state for 
damages, claiming that the Minister was vicariously liable for the wrongdoing of 
the three police officers. The SCA, following Phoebus, held that the state was 
not liable. The Constitutional Court held otherwise because the policemen, 
while committing the rapes, were acting for their own purposes, but at the same 
time neglected to perform their duties as policemen. Significantly the 
Constitutional Court said that vicarious liability is a question of policy with a 
constitutional dimension.  
I do not wish to debate the right or wrong of either judgment. I just do not know 
what the 'new' common-law rule is supposed to be. If one has regard to the fact 
the United States Supreme Court is able to hold that exhibiting the Ten 
Commandments in a court building is unconstitutional but not if they are 
exhibited in a public park one can only conclude that constitutional judgments 
need not be consistent.  
 
Let me recall the fate of the famous French chemist Antoine Lavoisier, also 
known as the father of modern chemistry, who lost his head – literally – in 1794. 
When the guillotine blade came down an inofficious bystander, Joseph-Louis le 
Grange, remarked that it took Lavoisier a second or so to lose his head but it 
will take France a few centuries to grow another one like his. Once you mess 
for the sake of the revolution with a rule that works it may take a long time to 
put matters right again. 
 
                                            
20  2005 (3) SA 179 (SCA); 2005 (9) BCLR 835 (CC). 
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Amending the Constitution 
Our Constitution – including the Bill of Rights – can, effectively, be amended 
with a two-third majority. And although government has never suggested an 
amendment to the Bill of Rights, the rest of the Constitution, which is the result 
of careful negotiations and which is supposed to be evolutionary and not 
revolutionary, is the object of regular amendment, on average twice yearly. This 
in itself is not necessarily a bad thing but some are concerned.  
 
A bill of rights should, like the bell tower of Pisa, stand the test of time. Although 
built somewhat askew on an unstable foundation, and sagging, it should keep 
standing for hundreds of years, even if it requires to be propped up regularly. A 
bill of rights should not be like the Zimbabwe ruins: built perfectly but now in 
complete ruin and we do not even know who built it. 
  
Conclusion 
I did not come to tell you about my judgments that had a constitutional element 
because, as Antoine de Saint-Exupéry said, "It is harder to judge oneself – and, 
one may add, the fruits of one's labours – than to judge others". I also did not 
come to tell you about all the great constitutional judgments our courts have 
delivered. Others have done so and will no doubt do so in the future. They may 
sometimes create the impression that we have invented the wheel, which is not 
quite true. What I did come to tell you, and you have experienced it already, is 
that judging under a bill of rights is sometimes different from judging without 
one, and it has its own challenges.  
 
A bill of rights is very much like any sacred text – Bible, Koran or whatever. Any 
true believer appreciates it as the primary and ultimate source of law and ethics 
and it regulates one's life immutably. On the other hand, true believers tend to 
interpret such texts differently. The Calvinists find pre-destination in the same 
text where others find the free will. They can give rise to the philosophy of St 
Thomas Aquinas or the sophistry of his greatest critic, the 'subtle Scots doctor' 
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Duns Scotius. Most find in them things not said or intended. They are open to 
abuse. Even the devil can cite scripture for his (or her) own purpose. 
 
One could write a history (wrote the Nobel Prize winner FA Hayek) of the 
decline of the Rule of Law, the disappearance of the Rechtsstaat, in terms of 
the progressive introduction of vague formulae like 'fair' and 'reasonable' into 
legislation and jurisdiction, and of the increasing arbitrariness and uncertainty 
of, and the consequent disrespect for, the law and the judicature.21
 
  
But that is not what a bill of rights is supposed to do. It is supposed to remove 
arbitrariness, not only of legislation but also of adjudication. It is supposed to 
create legal certainty, not uncertainty. It is supposed to create respect for the 
law and the judicature, not disrespect. That it can do – and usually does – if we 
as judges respect its spirit.  
 
And for you on the Damascene road, ready to be blinded by a bill of rights, let 
me recall the words of Viscount Falkland (1641): 
 
When it is not necessary to change, it is necessary not to change. 
 
Coming to think of it, maybe I share something else with Lord Denning, in 
saying things that should rather have been left unsaid. 
 
                                            
21  Hayek (n 9) 81. 
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